More than 35 years after German reunification, the political divide between eastern and western Germany remains one of the country's most defining fault lines. As voters in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt head to the polls on Sunday, that contrast is set to come under renewed scrutiny.
The anti-immigration and Russia-friendly Alternative for Germany (AfD) is expected to perform strongly and is even aiming to enter state government. If successful, it would mark the first time a far-right party has taken power at the state level in post-war Germany. For Elisabeth Kaiser, the federal government's commissioner for eastern Germany and a lawmaker from the eastern state of Thuringia, the roots of today's political landscape stretch back to the upheaval that followed the collapse of East Germany.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) came to an end, eastern Germany underwent a dramatic transformation. State-owned industries closed, unemployment surged, and large numbers of people left in search of better opportunities, particularly young women. According to Kaiser, the experience left a lasting mark on many East Germans and became part of a shared regional memory.
Feelings of loss, uncertainty and the belief that life can change overnight have been passed from one generation to the next. Despite decades of investment and modernization, significant differences remain. Average wages and savings in the east continue to lag behind those in western Germany. Many major companies are still headquartered in the west, and eastern Germans remain underrepresented in political leadership.
At the same time, Kaiser points to clear progress. Billions of euros invested in infrastructure and economic development have helped attract industries seen as vital to the future. Many eastern regions also offer lower living costs, affordable housing, attractive natural surroundings, strong childcare systems and respected universities.Yet for many residents, persistent wealth gaps continue to fuel a sense of being overlooked and disadvantaged.
One of the AfD’s strongest messages centers on opposition to immigration, a stance that has found support across much of eastern Germany despite the region having a smaller foreign-born population than the west.The historical background differs sharply between the two parts of the country. While West Germany relied on large numbers of foreign guest workers during its post-war economic boom, East Germany brought in contract workers from countries such as Vietnam and Mozambique.
These workers often lived separately from the local population and were employed under temporary arrangements. As a result, Kaiser argues that East Germany never developed into an immigrant society in the same way as the west. Although East German authorities promoted an image of international solidarity, Kaiser notes that racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism were also present.
Following reunification, these tensions erupted in violent attacks against foreigners during the 1990s, a period often referred to as the “baseball bat years.”In recent years, opposition to migration has increasingly focused on asylum seekers from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. Kaiser says resentment has often been fueled by perceptions that newcomers receive benefits and support unavailable to others.
Nostalgia for life in the former East Germany, commonly known as “Ostalgie,” continues to play a role in the region’s political culture.Kaiser believes that during periods of uncertainty, people naturally look back on positive memories from the past. She argues that some populist actors have tapped into emotionally charged symbols from the GDR era.
One example is the Simson scooter, a familiar East German brand frequently used by AfD lead candidate Ulrich Siegmund. For many East Germans, the vehicle became a symbol of personal freedom because it allowed people to travel independently.At the same time, Kaiser warns that memories of greater security under communist rule can overlook the reality that daily life was heavily monitored and controlled.
She also emphasizes another source of eastern German identity: pride in the peaceful revolution of 1989. Many people view that historic movement as evidence that collective action can overturn even deeply entrenched systems.
The AfD’s call for closer ties with Russia remains controversial, particularly after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and what Berlin has described as hybrid attacks linked to the Kremlin. Kaiser sees historical experience as an important factor behind eastern Germany’s distinctive attitudes. She argues that many East Germans were shaped by a political culture that encouraged skepticism toward the United States and the transatlantic alliance.
Support for renewed dialogue with Russia remains relatively strong in parts of the east, although Kaiser says there is little indication that Moscow is interested in pursuing such diplomacy. She also believes the Soviet Union’s long dominance in eastern Europe left behind a lingering sense of caution. For some, that experience fostered the view that Russia should not be provoked.
As economic uncertainty and geopolitical tensions continue to shape public debate, some voices in western Germany have argued that support for eastern states should be reduced. Kaiser strongly rejects that idea, warning that ending financial transfers would only reinforce the sense of victimhood that the AfD often highlights. She argues that eastern Germany’s political trends should not be viewed in isolation.
Similar gains by both right-wing and far-left parties can also be seen in parts of western Germany. For Kaiser, the east functions as a political “seismograph” for the country, revealing anxieties and frustrations that may eventually emerge across Germany as a whole. With Saxony-Anhalt preparing to vote, the election may offer another glimpse into the forces reshaping German politics more than three decades after reunification.